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CASES NOTED
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - SELF-INCRIMINATION -
TIMELINESS IN RAISING THE QUESTION
Just two months after the passage of the Subversive Activities Control
Act of 1950,1 the Attorney General filed a petition with the Subversive
Activities Control Board charging the Communist Party of the United States
with being a Communist-action organization. The purpose of the charge
was to compel the registration of the Party with the Attorney General. The
Board ruled in favor of the government. After ten years of hearings,
remands and rehearings 2 the Board's conclusion received final affirmation
by the Supreme Court. Held, inter alia:3 the Communist Party is a Com-
munist-action organization required to register under the Subversive Activi-
ties Control Act. All aspects of the Party's contention that the registration
requirement violates the fifth amendment by compelling self-incrimination
were found to be premature for constitutional adjudication. Communist
Party of United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 81 Sup. Ct.
1357 (1961).
In order to discuss this complicated litigation, some of the provisions
of the act must be set forth. As part of the most comprehensive legisla-
tion ever adopted by the United States to deal with a threat to its internal
security, the Subversive Activities Control Act 4 seeks to regulate Communist
activities by means of public disclosure through registration. 5 'Fhis purpose
is implemented by provisions that require Communist-action organizations, 6
1. 50 U.S.C. §§ 781-810 (1958).
2. It was predicted when the charges were filed that the prosecution of this case
would take a long time. Sutherland, Freedom and Internal Security, 64 HARV. L. REv.
383, 412 (1951). Senator Douglas had estimated that each administrative hearing together
with judicial review would take three or four years. 96 CONG. REc. 14596 (1950). The
Attorney General himself estimated that registration litigation would take two to four years.
N.Y. Herald Tribune, Nov. 23, 1950, p. 1, col. 1.
3. It was also held that the registration provisions of the act do not offend the first
amendment freedoms, nor are they unconstitutional as a bill of attainder.
4. The Internal Security Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 987 (codified in 50 U.S.C. §§
781-98 and other scattered sections) is divided into two titles; the short name of title I
is the "Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950." Internal Security Act of 1950, § 1(a),
64 Stat. 987. [Hereinafter title I of the Internal Security Act of 1950 will be cited as
ISA.]
5. Communist Party of United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 81 Sup.
Ct. 1357, 1440 (1961). The act, couched in terms of "Communist organizations," was
apparently designed more specifically for the regulation of the Communist Party itself. Four
years after its passage, another statute, which is clearly in juxtaposition with it, was passed.
The Communist Control Act of 1954, 68 Stat. 775 (codified in scattered sections of 50
U.S.C.) states that the Communist Party, although purportedly a political party, is actu-
ally an instrumentality of a conspiracy to overthrow the government. Anyone who know-
ingly and wilfully becomes or remains a member of the Communist Party is subject to all
of the provisions and penalties of the Internal Security Act of 1950, as a member of a
Communist-action organization. Chase, The Libertarian Case for Making It a Crime To
Be a Communist, 29 TEMP. L.Q. 121, 126 (1956).
6. The statute classifies those "Communist-organizations" required to register as
Communist-action and .ommunist-front. ISA §§ 3(3), (4), 50 U.S.C. §§ 782(3), (4)
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their officers and members, to be registered with the Attorney General,
and specific information regarding their activities and internal business to
be filed. Registration of a Communist-action organization might occur
by either of two methods: (1) the organization may register voluntarily,7
or (2) the Attorney General may petition the Subversive Activities Control
Board for an order that the organization register.8
In the latter situation, if the Board grants the order, the registration
may be effectuated in the following manner: (1) within thirty days after
the order becomes final, the organization must register, listing the partners,
officers and directors in its statement;9 (2) if the organization fails to
register, it becomes the duty of the officers to file the registration statement
(1958). A Communist-action organization is one which (1) is substantially directed, domi-
nated or controlled by the foreign government or foreign organization controlling the world
Communist movement, and (2) operates primarily -to advance the objects of such world
Communist movement. The "foreign control" reference obviously means the Soviet Union
and the Cominform. See Hearings on S. 1194 and S. 1196 Before a Subcommittee of the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1950).
7. ISA § 7(c), 50 U.S.C. § 786(c) (1958). It is the duty of the Attorney
General to publish in the Federal Register the names of the organizations which register.
ISA § 9(d), 50 U.S.C. § 788(d) (1958). A search of the Federal Register revealed that
no organization has voluntarily registered thus far.
8. ISA § 13(a), 50 U.S.C. § 792(a) (1958). This was the procedure followed in
the instant case. The Board, created by ISA § 12(a), 50 U.S.C. § 791(a) (1958), is the
keystone of the operation of the act. Note, 51 COLUM. L. REv. 606, 621 (1951). A quasi-
judicial tribunal, the Board is divorced from both the legislative and executive departments
of government. It is not the investigator, prosecutor, nor administrator of the act; its
function is solely judicial. The administration of the act is the duty of the Attorney Gen-
eral. Registration must be made with the Attorney General on a form prescribed by him.
ISA § 7, 50 U.S.C. § 786 (1958). (Provisions concerning this form are found in 28
C.F.R. § 11.200 (1962). It is Department of Justice Form 1S-51.) It is he who main-
tains the register, institutes proceedings before the Board in behalf of the government and
makes the necessary investigation. ISA §§ 7(g), 9, 13, 50 U.S.C. §§' 786(g), 788, 792
(1958). Proceedings before the Board must be open, and all evidence must be subject to
cross-examination by counsel. Judicial review is provided for an aggrieved party to the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia. If it affirms the Board's order, or dismisses the
petition for review, the order becomes a final order unless certiorari is granted by the
Supreme Court, in which case the order becomes final ten days after the Supreme Court
ruling or denial of certiorari. When the order becomes final, certain consequences ensue,
other than the duty to register. The Party may not distribute publications through the
mails or in interstate or foreign commerce, nor may it sponsor radio or television broadcasts
without the required identification. ISA § 10, 50 U.S.C. § 789 (1958). Tax exemptions
are denied the Party by ISA § 11, 50 U.S.C. § 790 (1958). Members may not apply for or
use a United States passport. ISA § 6(a), 50 U.S.C. § 785(a) (1958). They may not hold
government or labor union employment. 50 U.S.C. § 784(a) (1) (1958). Certain
members are subject to definite disqualifications-if aliens, they may not enter the United
States, may not be naturalized, may be deported, and may be denaturalized in some circum-
stances. Immigration and Nationality Act § 212, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182, 1251, 1424, 1451
(1958). Employment by the Party is not "employment" for purposes of the Social Security
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 410 (1958). Contributions to the Party are not tax deductible. ISA§ 11, 50 U.S.C. § 790 (1958). Acts by third parties with regard to the Party or its
members-the contributing of funds or services to the Party by government or defense-
facility personnel, issuance of passports to Party members-are, under specified circum-
stances, prohibited. ISA §§- 5, 6, 50 U.S.C. §§ 784, 785 (1958).
9. ISA § 7, 50 U.S.C. § 786 (1958). The act itself only specifies that names of these
office holders must be "contained" in the registration statement. Department of Justice
Form IS-51, issued by the Attorney General in 28 C.F.R. § 11.205 (1962), pursuant to
the above cited section of the act, contains the following instruction: "It is desirable, but
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within ten days after the expiration of the thirty-day period; 10 (3) upon
the failure of the officers to register, the members of the Communist-action
organization must register individually."'
In ruling that the Communist Party must register, the Supreme Court
was confronted with the contention of the Party that the registration
requirements were unconstitutional as violative of the fifth amendment
self-incrimination clause.12  According to one of the oldest maxims of the
common law, a person may refuse to answer any question, the answer
to which may render him punishable for a crime, or which in any degree
may tend to establish a public offense with which he might be charged.13
The soundness of the principle has seldom been questioned.' 4  It has been
incorporated among the guarantees of personal liberty in England, and in
the federal and all state constitutions in the United States. 5 It was early
not necessary that an officer of the organization sign immediately below." (Emphasis sup-
plied.) If no officer signs, the person filing the registration statement must certify in
writing that he has been authorized to do so by the Communist organization being
registered.
10. ISA § 7(b), 50 U.S.C. § 786(h) (1958).
11. ISA § 8, 50 U.S.C. § 787 (1958). Criminal penalties are imposed upon organ-
izations, officers and individual members who fail to register as required. Section 15 of
the act, 50 U.S.C. § 794 (1958), provides for a fine of up to $10,000, plus five years injail for the individuals, for each day of non-compliance after the deadline for registration.
12. The Party's apprehension of incrimination arises primarily out of the fact that
"active" membership in the Communist Party was made a crime by the Smith Act, 18
U.S.C. § 2385 (1958), providing for punishment for knowingly advocating the desirability
of overthrowing the government by force and violence, or organizing or helping to organize
any society or group which teaches, advocates, or encourages such overthrow of the govern-
ment, or being or becoming a member of such a group with knowledge of its purposes.
This latter provision was upheld the same day the instant case was handed down. In Scales
v. United States, 81 Sup. Ct. 1469 (1961), the Court held that active membership in the
Communist Party by one having guilty knowledge and intent is a sufficiently substantial
relationship to the criminal activity of advocacy of the violent overthrow of the government
to render a member criminally responsible without violation of the due process clause of the
fifth amendment. The Court rejected the argument that the membership provision of the
Smith Act had been repealed by § 4(f) of the Subversive Activities Control Act, 50 U.S.C.
§ 783(f) (1958), which states: "Neither the holding of office nor membership in any
Communist organization by any person shall constitute per se a violation of . . . any
criminal statute."
13. RAPALJE, CONTEMPT § 73, at 92 (1887).
14.- However, the wisdom of the maxim was questioned by Seymour D. Thompson,
an eminent law writer and judge: "It is believed that the maxim (nemo seipsum accusare
tenetur) originally meant that no one should be compelled, by torture, to criminate him-
self. It was applicable to a time when suspected persons were put to the rack for the pur-
pose of extorting confessions from them . . . . [C]ertainly, in such a state of the law, a
maxim which allowed him to keep his mouth shut, was a humane maxim, and was justly
prized. But such a maxim has no place in an enlightened and humane system of juris-
prudence. We have outgrown it. . . . If a gang of thieves and counterfeiters were to meet
together for the purpose of framing a code of laws for their own protection, this would be
the first section of their code. The just view of the matter is that the purpose of all inquiry
in courts of justice is to elicit truth, and that no privilege of not telling the truth ought to
be accorded to him who, in nearly all cases, is best acquainted with the real facts of the
case." Thompson, Criminal Contempts, 5 CRiM. L. MAc. 151, 182, 183 (1884).
As if in answer to Judge Thompson, Mr. Justice Douglas in his dissent said: "The
privilege is often criticized as a shield for wrongdoing. But not every hostile silence which
greets official interrogation has its beginning in wrongdoing." Communist Party of United
States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 81 Sup. Ct. 1357, 1454 (1961).
15. RAPALJE, op. cit. supra note 13.
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articulated by John Marshall that not only direct evidence, but also those
facts which would give information leading to the discovery of relevant
evidence can not be compelled to be disclosed.16
This rule was specifically applied to the questions involving Com-
munist activity in Blau v. United States.17 A federal grand jury sought
information from the defendant about her employment by the Communist
Party of Colorado. Her refusal to testify on the ground that the answers
might tend to incriminate her led to a finding that she was in contempt
of court. The Supreme Court reversed her conviction, reasoning that it
was immaterial whether these admissions would in themselves support a
conviction under a criminal statute. "Answers to the questions would
have furnished a link in the chain of evidence needed in a prosecution of
petitioner for violation of the Smith Act."'"
The registration requirement for Communist Party members has been
tested against the self-incrimination clause of a state constitution and found
invalid. In People v. McCormick9 the defendant's demurrer to a charge
of having failed to register as a member of a Communist organization was
sustained. The ordinance involved was unconstitutional because "the pro-
tection intended applies even before the commencement of a criminal case
and secures one who may reasonably be expected to be a defendant from
furnishing ammunition to be used against him. '20
In the light of this reasoning regarding the importance of protection
from self-incrimination, the Supreme Court considered another highly impor-
tant constitutional principle, the rule that potential impairment of consti-
tutional rights under a statute does not of itself create a justiciable
controversy in which the nature and extent of those rights may be litigated.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the five Justice majority, said: "No
rule of practice in this Court is better settled than 'never to anticipate a
question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.' "121
16. "Many links frequently compose that chain of testimony which is necessary to
convict an individual of a crime. It appears to the court to be the true sense of the rule
that no witness is compellable to furnish any one of them against himself." United States
v. Burr, 25 Fed. Gas. 38, 40 (No. 14692e) (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
17. 340 U.S. 159 (1950).
18. Id. at 161. (Emphasis added.) The Blau decision was the precedent for Quinn
v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955) and Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190 (1955),
both of which held that a witness might refuse to answer a congressional committee's ques-
tion as to his alleged Party membership on the basis that his answer might tend to
incriminate him.
19. 102 Cal. App. 2d 954, 228 P.2d 349 (Super. Ct. 1951).
20. Id. at 957, 228 P.2d at 351.
21. Communist Party of United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 81 Sup.
Ct. 1357, 1397 (1961 ). Justice Frankfurter was quoting a prior case, Liverpool, New York
& Philadelphia S.S. Co. v. Commissioners, 113 U.S. 33 (1885). Perhaps the best way to
deal with the prodigious output of the October Tenn, 1960, without passing a Solomonic
judgment on it, is not to talk about what the Court did, but about whether it needed to
do it. "It happens that a number of this Term's most celebrated cases were as significant
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This principle is based upon the realization that, by the very nature of the
judicial process, courts can most wisely determine issues precisely defined
by the confining circumstances of particular situations.
Thus, the Court found it necessary to separate the contentions of the
Party into two categories - those which were ripe for constitutional adjudi-
cation22 and those which were contingent. Into the latter classification
fell all the self-incrimination issues presented by the Party. The plea
directed against the provisions requiring designated officers to file a regis-
tration statement in default of registration by the Party was held to be
premature. The challenge was conjectural because the Party itself might
choose to register.2 3  This reasoning applied a fortiori to the provisions of
the act relating to the registration of individuals. Constitutional issues
regarding alternatives two and three of the registration process 24 were sum-
marily dismissed because they were premature.
The Party argued that the requirement for officers to execute and sign
the statement on behalf of the Party was self-incriminatory per se. The
Court's answer was that it could not yet be known whether the officers
would actually claim their fifth amendment privilege, or whether the Attor-
ney General would honor this claim. 25 The Court conceded that in asserting
the privilege on the registration form the officers would necessarily reveal
for having brought into focus the uses and nonuses of techniques of withholding ultimate
constitutional adjudication, as for having wrought changes in substantive law. It may be
that questions of when, whether, and how much to adjudicate come as near as anything
else to explaining the frequent divisions within the Court." Bickel, Forward: The Passive
Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961).
22. See note 3 supra.
23. Mr. Justice Brennan in his dissent, said: "The possibility of 'voluntary' compli-
ance by the officials should not be a bar to a decision now. Given the structure of the
statute, compliance cannot indisputably be assumed to be a voluntary waiver of tile privilege.
The organization is under a duty by virtue of the order now before us to file a statement
in accordance with the Attorney General's requirements, on penalty of prosecution for not
filing a registration statement; the failure of the officials to complete, sign or file Form
ISA-i might subject it to such prosecution. And if the organization should not register
within the 30-day period specified in § 7(c), the officials are duty-bound . . . to effect its
registration, also on penalty of criminal sanctions. Plainly enough, then, the order generates
pressure on the officials to complete, sign and file to avoid the possibility of prosecution
either of the organization or themselves. The pressure may be increased by uncertainties
which attend efforts to make an acceptable claim of the privilege. If we pass the oppor-
tunity for decision now, officials may well comply out of fear that a later effort to make an
acceptable claim of privilege will fail." Communist Party of United States v. Subversive
Activities Control Bd., 81 Sup. Ct. 1357, 1462 (1961).
24. See notes 10 and 11 supra and accompanying text.
25. On November 10, 1961, the Communist Party, in a letter bearing the Party seal
but no individual signature, formally notified the Justice Department that it refused to
register as ordered. The refusal was based on a claim of each Party officer's constitutional
privilege "not to be a witness against himself." Attorney General Robert Kennedy said the
department replied in a telegram that "each and every claim of privilege in your letter of
November 10 is hereby rejected." Miami Herald, Nov. 19, 1961, p. 9-A, col. 1 (A.P. Re-
lease). On December 1, the Party was indicted for failing to register as a Communist-action
organization. Assistant Attorney General J. Walter Yeagley announced that the Justice De-
partnient would bring charges against individuals, presumably the top officers of the Party,
for failing to register. Miami Herald, Feb. 18, 1962, p. 14-B, col. 1 (A.P. Release).
1962]
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themselves to the government and thus admit the very fact they sought to
conceal. But it advocated that these "novel and difficult" questions raised
by this circumstance were all the more reason for delaying decision until
the time that enforcement proceedings for failure to register might be
initiated against the Party or its officers .2
The judicial restraint exercised by the Court regarding the provisions
of the act which apply to the registration of the members themselves, upon
the organization's default, seems wise. No actual "case or controversy"
under those provisions has yet arisen. However, it is submitted that the
validity of the order requiring the Party to register was indeed ripe for
adjudication. The question of the self-incrimination of the persons filing
that registration was not contingent. It is obvious that an organization
cannot register unless some individual or individuals execute the proper
documents. The statute and regulations make it the duty of designated
officials of the Party to complete and file the registration statement. In
the very act of complying with the registration order, these officers would
admit their status in the Party and also show knowledge of Party activities.
Certainly, according to BIlau and McCormick, as well as Scales v. United
States, 217 the admission of officership could be vital as a "link in the chain"
of evidence needed for conviction under the Smith Act.2 8
26. In People v. McCormick, 102 Cal. App. 2d 954, 228 P.2d 349 (Super. Ct.
1951), the defendant was charged with failure to register as a member of the Communist
Party. Justice Frankfurter indicated that that case illustrated the type of "standing" which
must be obtained before the question here presented could be adjudicated.
In arguing that the issue of self-incrimination is not now premature, the Party relied
heavily upon Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) for the proposition that, when
a statute compelling the production of potentially incriminating information allows the
exercise of the fifth amendment privilege only under circumstances which effectively nullify
the amendment's protection, the statute may be held unconstitutional and void, not merely
unenforceable in cases in which a proper claim of privilege is made. The statute involved in
the Boyd case was a customs revenue law, which gave the government the power to order a
person to produce in court his private books, invoices and papers, or to make the nonproduc-
tion of them a confession of the allegations which the government intended to prove. The
government had brought a civil action to compel the production of the defendant's papers,
not a criminal action to penalize the defendant. Under those circumstances the Court's
opinion was that "though the proceeding in question is divested of many of the aggravating
incidents," the result was to compel a man to be a witness against himself. The statute was
declared unconstitutional. Id. at 635.
The most that the Court would draw from this argument in the case at bar was
that "in a prosecution of the Party for failure to register, or in a prosecution of its officers
for failure to register the Party, the Court would have to determine whether the Subversive
Activities Control Act is a statute which, like the .statute in Boyd, unconstitutionally cir-
cumscribes the effectual exercise of the privilege." Communist Party of United States v.
Subversive Activities Control Bd., 81 Sup. Ct. 1357, 1417 (1961). The Boyd case will
probably be an important factor in litigating the constitutionality of the Subversive
Activities Control Act when it is again tested by the Party and its officers, now under
indictment for failing to comply with the registration order.
27. 81 Sup. Ct. 1469 (1961).
28. The Subversive Activities Control Act provides that the fact of registration shall
not be received in evidence to prove an alleged violation of any criminal statute. ISA §
4(f), 50 U.S.C. §, 783(f) (1958). Nonetheless, the filing of a registration statement
will reveal the identity of Party officers and might thus lead to information which could
[VOL. XVI
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This cogent argument was dismissed simply as "novel and difficult."
It is the duty of the officers to register the Party. If an officer must claim
the privilege in his own behalf, either on the registration statement itself
or on a separate form, he would thereby be forced to do more than merely
arouse suspicion, but would actually admit an element of a crime, namely,
his connection with the Party.
2 9
If the officers choose not to file a registration statement nor to claim
the privilege for themselves, their only alternative is to default in complying
with the Board's order. Default means the risk of criminal prosecution,
possibly at the phenomenal degree of ten thousand dollars a day plus five
years in prison for each day of that default. No person should be forced to
violate the law or to risk self incrimination before his constitutional claims
can be adjudicated.
TAYLOR MATTIS
MECHANIC'S LIENS - NOTICE OF PENDENCY NECESSARY
TO ENFORCE LIEN
In an action to foreclose a mechanic's lien, the defendant moved to
dismiss and to discharge the property for failure of the plaintiff to file a
notice of pendency within a year according to the provisions of the Florida
Mechanics' Lien Law.' The defendant had actual notice of the suit from
its inception, and the suit was instituted less than one year from the filing
of the claim of lien. The motion was denied. Held, reversed: a lien is
discharged for failure of the claimant to file a notice of pendency within
one year after the filing of the claim of lien as required by the unambiguous
terms of the statute. Trushin v. Brown, 132 So.2d 357 (Fla. App. 1961).
Mechanic's lien laws, although they confer a right in derogation of the
common law, are construed liberally in order to benefit the lien claimants. 2
be the basis of future prosecution for offenses to which Communist activities relate. The
immunity grant in the Subversive Activities Control Act is almost identical with that found
insufficient in Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892). The statute involved there
was struck down with the ruling that an immunity provision, to be effective in such cases,
must bar any subsequent criminal prosecution upon any information acquired directly or
indirectly from the use of the declarant's statement.
29. This rationale was used by Justice Brennan in dissent. Chief Justice Warren
concurred with him. Communist Party of United States v. Subversive Activities Control
Bd., 81 Sup. Ct. 1357, 1458 (1961).. See also Note, 51 COLUM. L. REV. 606, 619 (1951).
1. FLA. STAT. § 84.21 (1961): "No lien provided by this chapter shall continue
for a longer period than one year after the claim of lien has been filed unless within that
time an action to enforce the lien is commenced in a court of competent jurisdiction and a
notice of the pendency of, such action is filed with the clerk of the circuit court of the
county in which the :claim of lien is filed .... "(Emphasis added.)
2. Gallagher v. Campodonico, 121 Cal. App. 765, 5 P.2d 486 (Super. Ct. 1931);
United States v. Griffin-Moore Lumber Co., 62 So.2d 589 (Fla. 1953); Hendry Lumber Co.
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